1. The Historical Context
Since Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Ethiopia has been one of the world’s most populous land-locked countries. Losing direct access to the Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab forced Addis Ababa to depend heavily on neighbouring transit countries for maritime trade.
Many Ethiopian leaders regard this as a strategic disadvantage. In 2023, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described the land-locked status as “an existential issue” and framed access to the sea as a national priority.
Thus, the notion of obtaining a sea-route via Eritrea carries deep symbolic and economic weight for Ethiopia.
2. Renewed Push for Access and Diplomatic Messaging
In late October 2025, Prime Minister Abiy publicly called for international mediation with Eritrea over sea access, stating that Ethiopia’s claim was “irreversible” and reaffirming his government’s commitment to a peaceful and diplomatic approach.
He emphasised that Ethiopia did not intend to use force, and that any agreement would be grounded in “give-and-take” and mutual benefit.
Nonetheless, his remarks triggered concern in Asmara. Eritrean officials pressed back, emphasising their sovereignty and rejecting what they perceive as Ethiopian encroachment.
3. Why the Sea-Access Drive Matters
(a) Economic & Logistical Imperatives
Ethiopia imports and exports nearly all of its maritime trade through the port of Djibouti—some 95% or more. This dependency makes Addis Ababa vulnerable to bottlenecks, transit costs and external leverage.
Gaining access to a direct Red Sea corridor could lower logistics costs, diversify trade routes and improve export competitiveness.
(b) Strategic and Geopolitical Considerations
From Ethiopia’s viewpoint, access to a coast would strengthen its regional influence, potentially support naval ambitions, and reduce reliance on a single transit state.
Conversely, Eritrea sees such Ethiopian aspirations with suspicion. Port access and strategic corridors touch on issues of sovereignty, security, and regional alignment. Eritrea’s president has warned against what he calls external interference and suggested that other states are backing Ethiopia’s claims.
4. The Eritrea Factor: Sovereignty vs Access
Eritrea occupies a unique position: it holds the coastline in question, has a small population and is willing in some cases to engage economically with Ethiopia, yet remains highly sensitive to matters of territorial integrity.
Legal scholars note that while land-locked Ethiopia has a right of access under the United Nations Law of the Sea (Article 125), this right is conditional on an agreement with the coastal state—in this case, Eritrea—and does not entitle Ethiopia to ownership or sovereignty over Eritrean land or ports.
This means any Ethiopian request for a sea-route must tread carefully to respect Eritrean sovereignty, and must negotiate rather than dictate terms.
5. Alternative Routes and Options
Addis has explored multiple pathways:
- A 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with the self-declared Somaliland (in northern Somalia) aimed at leasing a stretch of coastline, giving Ethiopia maritime access. That deal raised diplomatic controversy.
- Discussions with Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti to diversify options. But most analysts agree that while there are alternatives, the closest and potentially most feasible coastline is in Eritrea.
6. The Current State of Relations: “Fluid but Fragile”
On one hand, Ethiopia and Eritrea are still officially at peace. The 2018 peace deal ended two decades of hostility and opened avenues for cooperation.
On the other hand, relations have cooled. Eritrea accuses Ethiopia of harbouring armed groups and interfering in its internal affairs; Ethiopia remains frustrated by delayed integration and economic returns.
The sea-access question now looms as a major test of whether the two neighbours can convert peace into a lasting strategic partnership—or drift back into rivalry.
7. Risks and Possible Flashpoints
- If Ethiopia frames the request as ownership of Eritrean ports rather than access, it could trigger a major diplomatic rupture or worse. Legal commentary warns that any semblance of forced takeover violates international law.
- Eritrean domestic politics are opaque; any perceived concession to Ethiopia might provoke internal backlash.
- Regional actors (Somalia, Egypt, Djibouti) watch closely, concerned about shifting balance of power, maritime bases and alignment with Gulf states.
- Logistics and economic viability: Access alone does not guarantee low-cost trade if infrastructure, port investment and transit rights are not clarified.
8. What to Watch in the Coming Months
- Whether Ethiopia and Eritrea initiate formal negotiations on a port/lease or transit deal.
- Whether third-party mediation (AU, UN, China, Gulf states) becomes active. Abiy has already invited international mediation.
- Investment and development announcements—ports, rail links, logistics corridors—that might signal commitment beyond rhetoric.
- Shifts in Eritrea’s diplomatic alignments: deeper ties with Egypt or the UAE may complicate access discussions.
- Reactions from regional neighbours: Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Egypt are all stakeholders and may respond if their interests are impacted.
9. Why This Matters Regionally
- For Ethiopia’s economic future: If access is secured, trade costs could fall significantly, boosting exports and diversifying logistics.
- For Eritrea’s role: A strategic corridor could help Eritrea monetise its coastline, attract investment and shift its regional standing.
- For the Horn of Africa: A successful deal could stabilise transport corridors, shift regional alliances and reduce tension over transit dependence.
- For international powers: The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are strategic choke-points; how this access question is resolved affects shipping, military presence and global trade.
10. In Summary
Ethiopia’s push for sea access via Eritrea currently sits in a dynamic zone of diplomacy, history, economics and regional power – fluid relations indeed. While Ethiopia consistently affirms its intention to pursue transit rights peacefully, the contours of how this will be achieved remain unclear. Eritrea, asserting its sovereignty, is unlikely to accede without robust terms and guarantees.
Ultimately, the outcome will depend on whether both nations choose cooperation and negotiation over rivalry and suspicion. If managed well, a mutually beneficial access deal could reshape regional logistics and foster stronger bilateral ties. If mismanaged, it could reopen old wounds and destabilise a fragile peace.
